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Regulating in a Radioactive World: the FDA and Radionuclide Contamination 
 
 
Abstract:  This paper traces the historical development of FDA regulation of radionuclide 
contamination of food, a subject that received surprisingly scant attention in the legal literature.  
As the agency has remolded its policies in response to successive crises, it has had to be 
particularly mindful of the public relations implications of its actions, given the fears 
surrounding nuclear radiation.  This paper argues that in light of the unique challenges posed by 
radionuclide contamination—namely, the persistent scientific uncertainty about the effects of 
radiation, and the cognitive biases that lead the public to overestimate the risks involved—the 
FDA should seek to better coordinate its radiation contamination policy with other agencies, and, 
more controversially, develop a policy of greater circumspection in release of information to the 
public. 
 
 
 
To place the radiation levels from Fukushima in brief perspective, it is important to 
recognize that we live in a radioactive world.  A banana, for example, has 10 Bq of 
activity, that is, 10 radioactive potassium atoms decay every second. . . .  Bricks and 
granite contain radioactive materials that result in radiation exposures to the public . . . .   
The Capitol Building was constructed with granite and is frequently cited as having some 
of the highest radiation levels in all of the United States. . . .  Not only do we live in a 
radioactive world, our bodies are radioactive. 
 
- John D. Boice, Jr., Sc.D., Scientific Director of the International Epidemiology Institute, 
in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives
1 
 
                                                 
1 House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Statement of 
John D. Boice, Jr., Sc.D., Scientific Director, International Epidemiology Institute, CONG. Q. CONG. TESTIMONY, 
May 13, 2011. 2 
 
The Tohoku Earthquake that struck northern Japan on March 11 with a magnitude of 
9.0,
2 creating a powerful tsunami and soon after a devastating cascade of failures at the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, left a sorrowful human and economic toll.  Moreover, as 
the nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi plant deepened, global speculation swirled about the 
dangers posed by the release of radiation from the damaged plant, not only to Japan but to the 
rest of the world.  The United States was no exception; indeed, the nation’s own surgeon general, 
Regina Benjamin, suggested in an interview on March 15 that it was no overreaction for 
Americans to stock up on potassium iodide pills—which protect against thyroid cancer in the 
event of exposure to radioactive iodine-131—as a “precaution.”
3   
While Benjamin’s advice was retracted two days later,
4 her statement both contributed to 
and signaled deep public unease about the health implications of the nuclear crisis.  It should 
come as no surprise, then, that the disaster prompted a flurry of responses by regulators.  In 
particular, following Japanese regulators’ announcement that they had discovered higher than 
normal levels of radiation in spinach and milk up to 90 miles away from the site of the accident,
5 
Americans looked to the Food and Drug Administration to ensure that the nation’s food supply 
was safe.   
The FDA’s response to the Fukushima crisis appears to have thus far been successful in 
the narrow sense of ensuring, through testing of both domestic and imported food, that the 
                                                 
2 USGS Updates Magnitude of Japan’s 2011 Tohoku Earthquake to 9.0, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (March 14, 
2011, 5:35 PM), http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=2727. 
3 William J. Broad, Drumbeat of Nuclear Fallout Fear Doesn’t Resound With Experts, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/science/03radiation.html?scp=7&sq=japan%20radiation%20release&st=cse&g
wh=96E1C12E5813D49ED173F21803B0F535. 
4 Id. 
5 Ken Belson and Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Finds Tainted Food Up to 90 Miles From Nuclear Sites, N.Y. TIMES 
(March 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/world/asia/20japan.html?ref=milk&gwh=49D77450DB83E 
168EC5FF82B38594DCA. 3 
 
nation’s food supply is free of harmful levels of radionuclide
6 contamination.  However, the 
FDA has perhaps not been as successful in terms of public relations.   
This difficulty, this paper will argue, has accompanied the historical development of the 
agency’s regulation of radionuclide contamination of food from the start.  In Part I, the paper will 
trace the development—heretofore not chronicled in the legal literature—of FDA regulation of 
radionuclide contamination, from nuclear testing in the early Cold War through three prominent 
nuclear accidents, one in the United States and two overseas: the crises at Three Mile Island, 
Chernobyl, and Fukushima.  Part II will argue that FDA regulation of radionuclide 
contamination faces two major problems which impede its effectiveness: the insufficiently 
advanced state of scientific knowledge about the long-term effects of radionuclide exposure on 
human health, and the cognitive biases which lead the public to overestimate the risks posed by 
radiation.  Finally, Part III will argue that in order to surmount these challenges, the FDA should 
seek to better coordinate its regulation of radionuclide contamination with other agencies; and, 
more controversially, should be more circumspect in the way it releases information to the public.   
 
I.  The History of FDA Regulation of Radionuclide Contamination 
A.  The Origins of FDA Regulation 
1.  Regulation Prior to FDA Involvement 
The harmful effects of large doses of radiation on the human body became known soon 
after the discovery of x-rays; beginning in 1928, the International Commission on Radiation 
                                                 
6 Radionuclides are elements with unstable nuclei, capable of emitting radiation in the form of alpha, beta, or gamma 
rays, and sometimes more than one of these.  See Commonly Encountered Radionuclides, EPA (March 24, 2011), 
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides.  Radionuclides monitored by the FDA include iodine-131, cesium-134, 
cesium-137, ruthenium-103, ruthenium-106, strontium-90, plutonium-238, plutonium-239, and americium-241.  See 
Supporting Document for Guidance Levels for Radionuclides in Domestic and Imported Foods, FDA (May 25, 
2009), http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/FoodContaminantsAdulteration/ChemicalContaminants/Radionuclides/ 
UCM078341. 4 
 
Protection, a scientific body, began to issue exposure standards applicable to those who are 
exposed to smaller doses over a long period of time, and in particular to those exposed 
occupationally.
7  A national scientific body, the National Committee on Radiation Protection and 
Measurements, was formed (in a reorganization from a prior body) in 1946 to serve a similar 
purpose.
8   
Although the first nuclear weapon was tested in 1945, significant Congressional attention 
would not be directed toward the threat to public health posed by long-term exposure to radiation 
produced by nuclear energy until the late 1950s, following a dramatic expansion of nuclear 
testing spurred by the escalating arms race of the Cold War: between 1955 and 1957, the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom detonated a total of 112 nuclear devices, 
compared to only 45 in the three years prior.
9  In 1957, Congress’s Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy held public hearings addressing “The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on 
Man.”
10  In its report, the Committee concluded that while there were differences of opinion 
among those who testified as to the biological effects of radiation, “it would appear from the 
information presented that the consequences of future testing over the next several generations at 
the level of testing over the last 5 years could constitute a hazard to the world’s population.”
11  A 
series of similar hearings followed, and in 1959 Congress created the Federal Radiation Council 
(FRC) to provide “guidance for all Federal agencies in the formulation of radiation standards and 
in the establishment and execution of programs of cooperation with States.”
12  The FRC was 
                                                 
7 FEDERAL RADIATION COUNCIL, FEDERAL GUIDANCE REPORT NO. 1: BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS 1 (May 1960), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/docs/federal/frc_rpt1.pdf [hereinafter FRC REPORT 1]. 
8 Id. 
9 Table of Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL (Nov. 25, 2002), 
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab15.asp. 
10 FRC REPORT 1, supra note 7, at 1. 
11 104 CONG. REC. 7973 (daily ed. May 5, 1958) (statement of Sen. Clinton Anderson). 
12 Id.  5 
 
created at President Eisenhower’s direction in order to resolve a perceived conflict of interest 
between the two purposes of the Atomic Energy Commission—to promote the development of 
atomic weapons and energy, and to protect the public from nuclear hazards.
13 
The FRC produced a series of eight reports in the 1960s focused on the health effects of 
long-term exposure to radiation, in particular from fallout from the detonation of nuclear devices.  
(The concern over nuclear fallout was reflected at the international level in the signing of the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibited nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space, 
or under water, but permitted underground testing).
14  The reports predicted the amounts of 
specific radionuclides to which Americans would be exposed, noting that “[t]here is a special 
interest in those radionuclides that enter the body through the diet” and describing the 
mechanism by which fallout could reach humans through the food chain either directly from 
plants or via ingestion by animals.
15  Ultimately, the reports concluded that “the health risk from 
radioactivity in food over the next several years would be too small to justify protective actions 
to limit the intake of radionuclides either by diet modifications or by altering the normal 
distribution and use of food, particularly milk and dairy products,”
16 and asserted that nationwide 
programs to reduce the population’s exposure to fallout were unnecessary.
17  However, the FRC 
                                                 
13 COMMITTEE FOR REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE MEDICAL USE PROGRAM OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMMISSION, RADIATION IN MEDICINE: A NEED FOR REGULATORY REFORM (Kate-Louise D. Gottfried & Gary Penn 
eds., 1996) [hereinafter RADIATION IN MEDICINE]. 
14 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,  
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/ltbt1.html. 
15 FEDERAL RADIATION COUNCIL, FEDERAL GUIDANCE REPORT NO. 4: ESTIMATES AND EVALUATION OF FALLOUT IN 
THE UNITED STATES FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING CONDUCTED THROUGH 1962 11 , available at 
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/docs/federal/frc_rpt4.pdf. 
16 FEDERAL RADIATION COUNCIL, FEDERAL GUIDANCE REPORT NO. 7: BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS 43 (May 1965), available at http://www.epa.gov/radiation/ 
docs/federal/frc_rpt7.pdf [hereinafter FRC REPORT 7]. 
17 Id. at 44. 6 
 
recommended that “[s]urveillance of the radionuclide content in food products contaminated 
with worldwide fallout be continued at levels appropriate to the situation.”
18 
In these reports, the FRC established the framework that would be the basis of later FDA 
regulation.  Crucially, the severe limitations on the agency’s knowledge of risks were quickly 
apparent.  The Council acknowledged that while immediate radiation effects had been directly 
observed, delayed effects must be “inferred from consideration of experimental knowledge in 
animals, from available epidemiological statistical observations, and from a limited number of 
medical and industrial case observations.”
19  Moreover, the delayed effects of radiation exposure, 
in isolation, were indistinguishable from ordinary human illnesses.
20  And while there was 
agreement among scientists that the relation of dose to effect was linear for genetic effects, 
scientists could not agree on the dose-effect relationship for somatic effects.
21  For both 
categories, it was becoming increasingly accepted by scientists that there was no “threshold” at 
which danger from exposure began; rather, lower levels of radiation could only mean lower 
levels of risk.  As a result, standards “must be established by a process of balancing biological 
risk and the benefits derived from radiation use.”
22 
With these limitations in view, the FRC introduced the Protective Action Guide (PAG), 
representing a consensus as to when “intervention” was required to prevent most of the exposure 
of the public to a radiation risk that would otherwise occur.  The types of intervention considered 
by the agency included 1) “[a]ltering production, processing or distribution practices,” 2) 
“[d]iverting affected products to uses other than human consumption,” and 3) condemning the 
                                                 
18 Id. at 43. 
19 FRC REPORT 1, supra note 7, at 4. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 8. 
22 Id. at 37. 7 
 
products affected.
23  The FRC acknowledged that PAGs did not represent a pure evaluation of 
risk, but rather, took account of “health, economic, sociologic and political factors,” including 
“agricultural policies, the known feasibility of protective actions, related health impacts and 
similar considerations involved in the national interest.”
24  Moreover, the PAGs introduced by 
the FRC were not detailed enough to serve as a practical guide to other agencies as to when to 
take protective action with regard to a given food that might be contaminated, since they only 
provided a single number (actually three numbers, given different categories of radiation 
contamination pathways
25) representing the mean dosage of radiation to a member of the general 
public that would warrant intervention.
26 
In 1970, President Nixon issued an executive order disbanding the FRC and placing its 
functions within the new EPA.
27  Thereafter, the EPA produced environmental standards for the 
operation of nuclear power facilities, and was responsible for long-term regulation of 
radioactivity in the environment.
28 
2.  The FDA Steps In 
  In 1975, the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA) led an interagency effort to guide 
radiological incident emergency response planning, and assigned to the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare the responsibility of issuing “guidance on appropriate planning actions 
necessary for evaluating and preventing radioactive contamination of foods and animal feeds and 
                                                 
23 FRC REPORT 7, supra note 16, at 2. 
24 Id. at 6. 
25 The three categories of PAGs were for contamination through milk supplies; transmission through other dietary 
pathways within the first year after a contaminating event; and “long-term transmission of strontium-90 through soil 
into plants in the years following a contaminating event,” respectively.  Id. at 1–2. 
26 Id. at 2.  
27 RADIATION IN MEDICINE, supra note 13. 
28 Accidental Radioactive Contamination of Human Food and Animal Feeds, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,790, 58,790–91 (Dec. 
15, 1978) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1090). 8 
 
the control and use of such products should they become contaminated.”
29  Within the 
Department, that responsibility was delegated to the FDA.
30   
In 1978, taking up the FPA’s call,
31 the FDA took its first step into regulating 
radionuclide contamination, issuing standards on “Accidental Radioactive Contamination of 
Human Food and Animal Feeds.”
32  The standards were issued as a proposed rule in the Federal 
Register, but never became a final rule, therefore never entering the Code of Federal 
Regulations
33; thus, they did not have the binding force of law, but constituted an informal policy 
document that suggested how the FDA would respond in the event of a nuclear accident.
34  The 
FDA used the FRC’s general PAGs as a basis for developing more detailed standards, noting that 
since the publication of the FRC reports, “data on radiation risks have been reviewed in light of 
additional information on biological effects that became available.”
35  Because the FDA had 
been assigned authority exclusively with regard to exposure to radiation from nuclear events 
through the food pathway, it proposed recommendations on the presumption that the exposed 
population receives only insignificant doses through other pathways.
36 
  The FDA expanded on the PAG structure provided by the FRC in two important ways.  
First, it bifurcated the FRC’s PGA analysis into a two-tiered standard, with different responses 
                                                 
29 Id. at 58,790. 
30 Id. 
31 In the same year, FPA was made part of the newly created Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  
See Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness, 47 Fed. Reg. 10,758 (March 11, 1982) (to be codified at 44 
C.F.R. pt. 351). 
32 Accidental Radioactive Contamination of Human Food and Animal Feeds, supra note 28, at 58,790. 
33 The FDA reconsidered the proposal to codify the recommendations in 1982, ultimately deciding to issue them in 
the form of a notice in the Federal Register rather than as a formal rule.  Accidental Radioactive Contamination of 
Human Food and Animal Feeds; Recommendations for State and Local Agencies, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,073, 47,074 (Oct. 
22, 1982). 
34 Cf. Sec. 560.750 Guidance Levels for Radionuclides in Domestic and Imported Foods (CPG 7119.14), FDA 
(April 30, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/FoodContaminantsAdulteration/ChemicalContaminants/ 
Radionuclides/UCM078331 [hereinafter Sec. 560.750 Guidance Levels for Radionuclides in Domestic and Imported 
Foods]. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 58,791. 9 
 
called for depending on the tier.
37  The “Preventive PAG” level was one at which only 
“protective actions causing minimal impact on the food supply are appropriate,” where 
responsible officials should take action to prevent or reduce radioactivity concentrations in 
food.
38  The higher “Emergency PAG” was the level at which “protective actions of great impact 
on the food supply are justified because of the projected health hazards.”
39  At this level, the 
FDA said, officials should isolate food and consider condemnation. 
  Second, the FDA extrapolated from PAGs to “derived response levels,” allowing for 
officials to compare radioactivity measurements directly to a relevant standard rather than have 
to predict how a measured radioactivity level would translate into a mean dosage to the 
population, as would be required if interpreting the FRC’s standards.  Derived response levels 
were established for several sources of measurement: “initial ground deposition ([radioactive] 
activity per unit of area), the concentration of radioactivity in milk (activity per unit of volume) 
or pasture (activity per unit of weight), and total dietary intake (total activity)” corresponding to 
the two PAG levels.
40  Moreover, beyond these categories, the FDA also provided guidance on 
how to apply the PAG levels to other kinds of food.
41 
  3.  The FDA’s Statutory Authority to Act 
  The statute from which the FDA derives the bulk of its regulatory authority—the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA)
42—was drafted before radioactivity in food was 
seriously considered as a potential danger; indeed, the first nuclear device had not yet been 
                                                 
37 An original draft of the regulation also included a third proposed PAG level at a lower threshold, the “Alert 
PAG.”  After the FDA received comments questioning the need for the Alert PAG on the basis that the regulation 
did not recommend protective action in such cases and that the invocation of an Alert PAG might unnecessarily 
alarm the public, among other considerations, the proposal was shelved.  Id. at 58,792. 
38 Id. at 58,791. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). 10 
 
detonated in 1938.  Where did regulation of radionuclide contamination of food fit into FDA’s 
statutory authority? 
The FDA was able to claim authority to regulate radionuclide contamination because of 
the broad authority granted by the FDCA.  Namely, section 402(a) of the Act
43 bestowed upon 
the FDA the authority to take enforcement actions against food that met the statutory definition 
of an “adulterated” food—namely, food that “bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious 
substance which may render it injurious to health.”
44  Such authority might be more limited if 
radionuclides were not considered an “added substance” under the Act, in which case the food 
could not be considered adulterated “if the quantity of such substance in such food does not 
ordinarily render it injurious to health.”
45  Indeed, given the uncertainties involved in forecasting 
the effects of a given level of radiation, it might be difficult to show that it is “ordinarily” 
“injurious to health.”  However, fortunately for the FDA, it had already begun to successfully 
regulate even naturally occurring contaminants as “added” substances under the Act.  For 
example, the FDA had previously enforced a regulation of mercury levels in swordfish on this 
basis.
46  Despite its environmental and (typically) nondeliberate provenance, then, radionuclide 
contamination could be subject to the full extent of FDA regulation as a contaminant. 
Moreover, according to the FDA in its proposed rule in 1978, the agency had established 
in a prior regulation
47 that when a food contaminant is unavoidable but cannot be approved under 
                                                 
43 21 U.S.C. § 342(a). 
44 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1). 
45 Id. 
46 See PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 368–69 (3d ed. 2007).  
47 21 C.F.R. 109.6 (1977). 11 
 
the “food additives” provision of the FDCA,
48 regulatory procedures to control the contaminant 
are still available.
49 
Alternatively, the FDA could rely on a different provision of the FDCA as the basis for 
its authority to regulate contaminated food, which seems to extend even broader discretion for 
the agency to take action.  Section 402(a) of the act also permits the FDA to classify as 
adulterated food that “has been prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it 
may have become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to 
health.”
50  So, for example, the agency could take action to protect the public from food that may 
have been exposed to unsafe levels of radionuclides in the agency’s estimation because of 
proximity to a nuclear accident, even if there is no evidence directly establishing unsafe levels of 
radiation in the food itself.
51 
Once a food that has been contaminated with radionuclides has been determined by the 
FDA to be adulterated, the agency has two primary enforcement mechanisms available to protect 
the public.  First, the agency can seize domestic foods under section 304 of the Act, “on libel of 
information.”
52  (It may then file suit in federal district court for condemnation.
53)  Second, the 
agency can refuse admission of goods to be imported, and detain them, under section 801 of the 
Act.
54 
B. The Three Mile Island Accident 
1.  The Accident and Immediate Responses 
                                                 
48 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2006). 
49 Accidental Radioactive Contamination of Human Food and Animal Feeds, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,790, 58,791–92 (Dec. 
15, 1978) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1090). 
50 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1). 
51 See Sec. 560.750 Guidance Levels for Radionuclides in Domestic and Imported Foods, supra note 34. 
52 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1).  See Sec. 560.750 Guidance Levels for Radionuclides in Domestic and Imported Foods, 
supra note 34. 
53 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1). 
54 21 U.S.C. § 381(a)(3).  See Sec. 560.750 Guidance Levels for Radionuclides in Domestic and Imported Foods, 
supra note 34. 12 
 
In the early morning hours of March 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island nuclear power 
facility, 10 miles south of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, suffered a series of breakdowns in the 
cooling system of the plant’s No. 2 reactor.
55  Technical problems delayed notification of the 
plant’s troubles to monitoring personnel, leading to extensive damage: 
 
The main feedwater pumps stopped running, caused by either a mechanical or electrical 
failure, which prevented the steam generators from removing heat.  First the turbine, then 
the reactor automatically shut down.  Immediately, the pressure in the primary system 
(the nuclear portion of the plant) began to increase.  In order to prevent that pressure from 
becoming excessive, the pilot-operated relief valve (a valve located at the top of the 
pressurizer) opened.  The valve should have closed when the pressure decreased by a 
certain amount, but it did not.  Signals available to the operator failed to show that the 
valve was still open.  As a result, cooling water poured out of the stuck-open valve and 
caused the core of the reactor to overheat. 
… 
Because adequate cooling was not available, the nuclear fuel overheated to the point at 
which the zirconium cladding (the long metal tubes which hold the nuclear fuel pellets) 
ruptured and the fuel pellets began to melt.  It was later found that about one-half of the 
core melted during the early stages of the accident.
56 
 
                                                 
55 Major Accident Occurs At Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant, Radiation Released; Crisis Said To Be Easing; 
Explosion, Meltdown Threatened Pa., FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, April 6, 1979, at 241 A1. 
56 Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (March 15, 2011), 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html.  13 
 
In the wake of the partial meltdown at Three Mile Island, regulators converged on 
Pennsylvania to evaluate the public health risk posed by the accident.  Indeed, no fewer than 
eight federal agencies contributed to monitoring the effects of radiation in the vicinity of the 
plant.
57  The FDA began testing milk and other food.
58  Immediately after the incident, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission served as the single spokesman for the agencies involved, but 
did not direct the collection of data or distribute the findings of one agency to other agencies.
59  
An NRC official estimated that the cumulative radiation dose to local residents would be less 
than 100 millirems,
60 roughly equivalent to the annual dosage from natural background 
radiation.
61   
Finally, on April 13, more than two weeks after the accident began, the White House 
designated the EPA as the coordinator for the agencies involved, suggesting that the public 
would be assured by “the most credible environmental data.”
62  The Department of Energy and 
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (home of the FDA) were reportedly ruled out 
because of opposing institutional perspectives on the health risks posed by radiation.
63 
The FDA collected and tested a large number of milk samples
64 from farms and dairies 
near the accident site, within a 20-mile radius.
65  The highest level of iodine-131 recorded was 31 
picocuries per liter,
66 which corresponded with a projected dose commitment of 0.005 rem over 
                                                 
57 Walter Pincus, EPA Named Head Monitor On Radiation, WASH. POST, April 14, 1979, at A4. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident, supra note 56. 
61 Pincus, supra note 57. 
62 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
63 Id. 
64 More than 500 samples were collected.  Kevin L. Ropp, FDA to the Rescue, 26 FDA CONSUMER (Oct. 1992). 
65 This Week In FDA History - March 28, 1979, FDA (May 20, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/ 
History/ThisWeek/ucm117712.htm. 
66 Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident, supra note 56. 14 
 
the course of an individual’s lifetime, assuming an infant drinking one liter of milk daily.
67  This 
represented a figure 300 times smaller than the protective PAG for a projected dose commitment 
to the thyroid gland of 1.5 rem.
68  Minute traces of cesium-137 were also found in some 
samples.
69 
Despite indications that radiation emanating from Three Mile Island did not pose an 
appreciable threat to the public, FDA took precautions to ensure its ability to respond in case of 
greater danger in the future.  Most importantly, the agency acted to ready supplies of potassium 
iodide.  Coincidentally, in late 1978, just a few months prior to the Three Mile Island incident, 
the agency had published a notice in the Federal Register inviting drug manufacturers to submit 
New Drug Applications for potassium iodide products, suggesting that the compound was safe 
and effective for the purpose of preventing harm from radioactive iodine.
70  Research indicated 
that oral administration of the drug could achieve blockage of radioactive iodine uptake by the 
thyroid gland—a cause of thyroid cancer—with greater than 90 percent effectiveness.
71  
However, the NRC failed to take action to order any of the drug to prepare for future nuclear 
incidents.
72   
Following the Three Mile Island incident, then, in order to ensure a sufficient supply of 
potassium iodide to the populated areas surrounding the plant, the FDA had to quickly contract 
with firms in Missouri, Michigan and New Jersey to supply it.  The chief of the agency’s 
Emergency Operations branch at the time, W. Remle Grove, has said, “We had people from what 
                                                 
67 Bernard Shleien, Protective Action Guides: Theory and Application: Lessons from the Three Mile Island Accident 
274, available at http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/12/575/12575507.pdf. 
68 Id. at 273–74. 
69 Ropp, supra note 64. 
70 Bernard Shleien et al., Recommendations on the Use of Potassium Iodide as a Thyroid Blocking Agent in 
Radiation Accidents: An FDA Update, 59 BULLETIN OF THE N.Y. ACADEMY OF MEDICINE 1009, 1009–10 (1983), 
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1911939/ pdf/bullnyacadmed00086-0155.pdf. 
71 Id. at 1010. 
72 NIRS Fact Sheet-KI, NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICE (March 2002), http://www.nirs.org/ 
factsheets/nirsfactsheetki.htm. 15 
 
was then the Bureau of Drugs scurrying around trying to find possible sources of potassium 
iodide to manufacture, package, and be made available for the states and consumers.”
73  
Ultimately, nearly 250,000 bottles of the drug were delivered to the area within 3 days of the 
accident.
74 
2.  Institutional Responses: Congressional and Executive 
The difficulties in coordinating agencies to respond to the threat of radioactive 
contamination from the Three Mile Island incident prompted some in Congress to reconsider 
how regulators should respond to such incidents.  Senators John Glenn and Abraham Ribicoff 
consequently introduced a bill entitled the Federal Radiation Protection Management Act of 
1979.
75  In hearings on the bill in 1980, Senator Glenn noted, “It has been almost exactly 1 year 
since the Three Mile Island accident pointed out most compellingly the real need for better 
coordination of the Federal radiation protection and research apparatus.  Events and studies since 
then, far from alleviating our concern, have confirmed and deepened it.”
76  Consequently, the 
announced purpose of the bill was “to insure adequate protection of workers, the general public, 
and the environment from harmful radiation exposure, to establish mechanisms for effective 
coordination among the various federal agencies involved in radiation protection activities, to 
develop a coordinated radiation research program, and for other purposes.”
77   
To accomplish these objectives, the bill called for the creation of two federal 
“interagency groups,” to be called the Federal Council on Radiation Protection and the Federal 
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Conference on Research into the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation.
78  The former group 
would be chaired by the Administrator of the EPA and would be responsible for coordinating 
federal regulation of radiation; the latter group would be chaired by the Director of the National 
Institutes of Health and would oversee agency involvement in radiation research.
79  Senator 
Glenn saw the creation of these groups as necessary because no governmental body had 
possessed sufficient authority to coordinate government response: “Some have argued that [the 
abolishment of the FRC in 1970 and transfer of its guidance function to the EPA] occurred 
because the FRC lacked a mandate and organization strong enough to accomplish its missions 
effectively.  We are concerned that that sense of weakness has persisted, notwithstanding 
transfers of authority.”
80 
The bill failed to pass, however, largely because the energy behind legislative reform was 
dissipated by the Carter Administration itself having taken initiative in solidifying the 
government’s ability to respond to nuclear accidents.  By executive order, President Carter 
established a Radiation Policy Council to advise on broad radiation policy; moreover, at the 
administration’s direction, the Secretary of HEW established an Interagency Radiation Research 
Committee to coordinate the planning, implementation, and evaluation of a research program on 
the biological effects of radiation.
81  In light of these developments, the administration took the 
position that “legislation establishing [similar administrative bodies] in statute is unnecessary.”
82 
3.  FDA Regulation in the Wake of Three Mile Island 
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The comment period for FDA’s proposed regulation from 1978 introducing standards for 
radionuclide contamination of food, in the form of PAGs and derived response levels, actually 
closed shortly before the Three Mile Island accident.  In light of the importance of the event and 
the extent to which it increased public awareness of the issues at stake, however, the agency 
considered comments submitted after the accident in its final regulation.
83 
The regulation issued in 1982 did not depart radically from the proposed rule issued four 
years earlier, but the agency did reconsider its proposed rule in two important ways.  First, as 
discussed above,
84 the FDA decided to issue its standards as a notice rather than a rule, 
“[b]ecause these recommendations are voluntary guidance to State and local agencies (not 
regulations).”
85  (As the agency demonstrated in its testing of foods after Three Mile Island, it 
also used the standards as guidelines for its own actions, though not legally bound to do so.)   
Second, the FDA considered revising its PAG recommendations in an upward direction 
(toward higher threshold levels) with respect to specific organs in light of new scientific 
evidence, which indicated that risks to specific organs were “quite different from the earlier 
assumptions.”
86  However, a recent revision of EPA radiation standards for occupational 
exposures along the same lines had recently “been subject to considerable controversy.”
87  As a 
result, the FDA declined to revise the organ PAGs, at least until such time as “a consensus in the 
United States emerges.”
88  It seems reasonable to conclude that its hesitation was also influenced 
by the outpouring of public concern with radiation levels following the Three Mile Island 
accident; given the regulatory confusion after that event, the agency’s easing of some standards 
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without an unassailable foundation might be viewed with increased skepticism by at least some 
segments of the public. 
The agency emphasized its specificity as to what kinds of action should be taken at 
Preventive and Emergency PAG levels.  In the case of milk containing radionuclides at the level 
of Preventive PAGs, the agency suggested “transfer of dairy cows from fresh forage (pasture) to 
uncontaminated stored feed;” in addition, it recommended “the diversion of whole milk 
potentially contaminated with short-lived radionuclides to products with a long shelf life to allow 
radioactive decay of the radioactive material.”
89  In contrast, at the Emergency PAG level, the 
FDA recommended that officials “isolate food to prevent its introduction into commerce and 
determine whether condemnation or other disposition is appropriate.”
90 
B.  The Chernobyl Accident 
1.  The Accident and Immediate Responses 
The threat to the public from Three Mile Island proved to be illusory—the “primary 
fallout” was financial rather than radioactive
91—but a far more serious nuclear accident in the 
Ukraine (in the former U.S.S.R.) in 1986 would have a severe impact in Europe, unsettle the 
American public more deeply, and test the FDA’s ability to ensure the public’s confidence in the 
safety of the nation’s food supplies.   
The accident was sparked on April 26 when the crew at the Unit 4 of the Chernobyl plant, 
roughly 80 miles north of Kiev, was conducting a test to determine how the plant would respond 
in the event of a loss of power: 
 
                                                 
89 Id. at 47,074. 
90 Id. 
91 See Joseph P. Tomain & Constance Dowd Burton, Nuclear Transition: From Three Mile Island to Chernobyl, 28 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 363, 365 (1987). 19 
 
A series of operator actions, including the disabling of automatic shutdown mechanisms, 
preceded the attempted test . . . .  By the time that the operator moved to shut down the 
reactor, the reactor was in an extremely unstable condition.  A peculiarity of the design of 
the control rods caused a dramatic power surge as they were inserted into the reactor. 
. . . 
The interaction of very hot fuel with the cooling water led to fuel fragmentation along 
with rapid steam production and an increase in pressure.  The design characteristics of the 
reactor were such that substantial damage to even three or four fuel assemblies can — 
and did — result in the destruction of the reactor.  The overpressure caused the . . . cover 
plate of the reactor to become partially detached, rupturing the fuel channels and 
jamming all the control rods, which by that time were only halfway down.  Intense steam 
generation then spread throughout the whole core (fed by water dumped into the core due 
to the rupture of the emergency cooling circuit) causing a steam explosion and releasing 
fission products to the atmosphere.  About two to three seconds later, a second explosion 
threw out fragments from the fuel channels and hot graphite.
92 
 
Following the explosions in Unit 4, massive amounts of radiation were released into the 
environment—at least five percent of the reactor core.
93  To prevent further release of 
radionuclides, boron and sand were poured onto the reactor from the air, and the unit was 
ultimately entombed in a concrete “sarcophagus.”
94  These measures, however, were insufficient 
to prevent radionuclides from spreading across a broad area.  Initial exposure was to iodine-131, 
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but cesium-137 became the more far-reaching hazard, with five million Europeans living in areas 
considered contaminated—200,000 of whom were ultimately resettled.
95 
Once the extent of the radiation release began to come into focus, the FDA moved to 
protect American food supplies.  Some early tests were actually performed for the protection of 
Americans abroad; the first worrisome FDA test results came from a sample of Moscow milk in 
May that contained double the derived intervention level for infants and pregnant women, 
leading the U.S. Embassy there to recommend that pregnant American women and infants there 
avoid drinking local milk.
96  Also in May, the FDA announced that it would begin routinely 
monitoring food imports from twelve European nations for radiation.
97  The agency began to test 
import samples on May 5; it also began to test domestic milk samples.
98  The FDA detected low 
levels of iodine-131 in Italian mushroom and fennel shipments, but not enough to trigger 
protective action.
99 
The FDA’s approach to safeguarding the food supply was criticized by some 
environmentalists.   This was perhaps inevitable given that its screening policy was dramatically 
less restrictive than the actions taken by the European Common Market nations: those countries  
blocked all imports of a number of food products from Eastern Europe.
100  Likewise, Canadian 
officials rejected substantial quantities of European imported food, and tested all shipments of 
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food imported from Europe.
101  One prominent environmentalist was quoted in a major 
newspaper criticizing the FDA’s response:  
 
The European and Canadian approach “is much more sensible and conservative from the 
point of view of protecting the public health of their citizens,” said Robert Alvarez of the 
Environmental Policy Institute in Washington.  “You have to assume a conservative 
posture when you're dealing with a lot of uncertainties.”
102 
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